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TESTED LOYALT IES : POL ICE AND POL IT ICS
IN SOUTH AFR ICA ,     –   *
BY KEITH SHEAR
University of Birmingham
ABSTRACT: Well into their rule, at a time when South Africa was increasingly
perceived as a police state, the Nationalists, the party of apartheid, depended for
the implementation of their policies on structures and personnel inherited from
previous governments. Even in the South African Police, the institution most
associated with the country’s authoritarian reputation, key developments of the
early apartheid decades originated in and cannot properly be understood without
reference to the preceding period. A legacy of conﬂict between pro- and anti-war
white policemen after  was particularly signiﬁcant. Concentrating on the
careers and views of illustrative oﬃcers, notably members of the Special Branch,
rather than on ‘the police’ in abstraction, this article analyses the complexities and
continuities in the South African state’s handling of domestic dissent in the years
before and after the apartheid election of .
KEY WORDS: South Africa, police, apartheid, nationalism.
ON  January ,  white policemen from across the industrially
important Witwatersrand area centred on Johannesburg were interned
under war emergency powers, apparently to forestall a coup attempt. One of
the men held that day was Hendrik Johannes van den Bergh, the future
founder of the notorious apartheid-era Bureau for State Security (BOSS).
The head of the country’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) claimed
that the detainees’ names matched those in records found in the house of a
brigade leader of the Stormjaers, the brownshirt activist division of the
Ossewabrandwag (OB), a militant Afrikaner republican movement opposed
to South Africa’s participation on Britain’s side in the Second World War.
Only weeks earlier, a former South African policeman and boxing champion,
Robey Leibbrandt, had been arrested, beginning a lengthy process against
him and several of his followers on treason charges. Leibbrandt, arriving from
Germany in June  with a plan to raise a rebellion and possibly assassinate
Prime Minister Jan Smuts, had been sheltered by several lower-ranking
policemen disillusioned with the seeming gradualism of the OB. Soon after
the mass arrest of January , the OB began a countrywide campaign of
* I thankMax Bolt, Saul Dubow, TomMcCaskie, Isaac Ndlovu, Insa Nolte, Benedetta
Rossi, Kate Skinner, Paul Ugor, and the Journal of African History’s reviewers for their
readings of earlier versions of this article. Piet Swanepoel kindly emailed responses to the
many questions I put to him. Author’s email: k.s.shear@bham.ac.uk
 Central Archives Depot, Pretoria (CAD) Secretary for Justice Archives (JUS) //
, J. J. Coetzee to Secretary for Justice (SJ),  January , encl. lists of detainees’
names and copy of undated memorandum, ‘Ossewabrandwag Stormtroopers’.
 H. Strydom, For Volk and Führer (Johannesburg, ).
Journal of African History,  (), pp. –. © Cambridge University Press  
doi:./S
sabotage against strategic infrastructure. Within months, hundreds
more Stormjaers had been arrested and the state was preparing to try another
 men for high treason. Despite this, OB-linked sabotage and espionage
continued sporadically through the remainder of the war.
Almost exactly two decades later, on  December , Umkhonto we
Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the underground African National Congress
(ANC), launched a sabotage campaign of similar magnitude that largely
ended when MK’s high command was arrested at Rivonia, north of
Johannesburg, in July . New security legislation increased the govern-
ment’s powers to restrict organisations and individuals, broadening the
deﬁnition of sabotage and raising the penalties following conviction to
include the death sentence, thereby making sabotage an oﬀence potentially
equivalent in seriousness to high treason. The new legislation, under which
the MK leaders were indicted and found guilty, also impeded the ANC
underground’s ability to regroup and helped the state to close in on smaller
rival networks of saboteurs who continued to operate after the Rivonia trial.
To the accusation that he should have known better than to enact punitive
arbitrary powers like those he personally had experienced under Smuts’s
wartime administration, Justice (later Prime) Minister B. J. Vorster, a former
OB general, retorted that his critics had remained silent in the s. In
many accounts, the identiﬁcation of the political quarry of the s with the
pursuers of the s is also personiﬁed by Van den Bergh, Vorster’s fellow-
internee at Koﬃefontein camp south-west of Bloemfontein who at the time of
the Rivonia arrests had led the Security Police for six months. Such accounts
seldom note that many of Vorster and Van den Bergh’s own erstwhile
pursuers remained policemen during the postwar decades and observed the
two men’s change of role and fortune from within. Vorster later recorded that
after becoming justice minister in August  he encountered ‘ever so many’
of the oﬃcers ‘involved in [his wartime] detention’, but that with one
exception he never ‘discussed it with anyone in the police force’. The two
parties therefore well understood their shared but largely unspoken history;
without forgetting their diﬀerences, by the s the quarry and predators
of the s had long joined forces in pursuing the ANC, the South African
Communist Party (SACP), and other movements opposing white supremacy.
This article explores how the lasting enmities that polarised the police
internally during the war were managed to limit or prevent their threat to the
writ of governments before and after .
If the evolution of the mid-century police – and particularly its
Special Branch, which to its contemporary critics exempliﬁed apartheid’s
 C. Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel: Radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the History of the
Ossewabrandwag (Berlin, ), –.
 G. C. Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots? (Johannesburg, ), –.
 S. Ellis, ‘The genesis of the ANC’s armed struggle in South Africa –’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, : (), – and ; J. D’Oliveira,
Vorster –The Man (Johannesburg, ), – and –.
 D’Oliveira, Vorster, – and –.
 Ellis, ‘The genesis’, , is a recent instance. See also M. Fullard, ‘State repression in
the s’, in South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), The Road to
Democracy in South Africa: Volume  (–) (nd edn, Pretoria, ), –.
 D’Oliveira, Vorster, –.
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menace – owed much to subsequently superseded wartime internal divisions,
then this has implications for longstanding debates about continuity and
change in the post- South African state. Participants in these debates
have engaged historical evidence at several levels – ideological, ethnic
political, economic, and state institutional. Their conclusions have depended
partly upon which of ‘apartheid’s primary imperatives’ they emphasise:
securing ‘racial political supremacy’ for whites in general; ensuring capitalist
economic development; or promoting the particular interests of Afrikaans-
speaking whites.
Which level scholars engaged or imperative they emphasised is no sure
predictor of where they stood on whether apartheid diﬀered qualitatively
from pre- segregation. Leftists of the s contended that apartheid’s
economically orthodox critics in the s and s had created an alibi for
capitalism by insisting that capitalism possessed inherently ‘racially integra-
tive and levelling tendencies’; by ignoring how policies of racial discrimi-
nation and repression underpinned South Africa’s entire twentieth-century
economic development; and by attributing discriminatory controls to a racist
Afrikaner mentality rooted in the pre-industrial frontier past that only
became fully ascendant politically in . Among themselves leftists
argued about whether segregation and apartheid were fundamentally diﬀerent
stages of capitalist order reﬂecting South Africa’s transition from a primarily
extractive economy and rural society to a predominantly manufacturing
economy and urban society. Meanwhile, a Foucauldian study of South
Africa’s ‘Grand Tradition’ of commissions of inquiry noted the discursive
continuity in how the state spoke to and of its African ‘others’ in successive
crises from the s to the s.
Historians writing since the political upheavals of the s, when
apartheid’s contradictions and vulnerabilities became unmistakable, have
been more receptive to the possibility that National Party (NP) policy and
practice were incoherent and internally contested from the outset – shaped as
much by opportunistic reaction to the contingencies of the s, or by
administrative overextension in the s, as by longer-term structural forces,
ethnic and ideological agendas, or discursive tropes. The Native Aﬀairs
Department (NAD) looms large in such studies, for the good reason that it
took intellectual ownership of the apartheid project, giving legislative form to
its keystone policies and direction to their implementation. Defence too is
 L. Forman and E. S. Sachs,The South African Treason Trial (London, ), –.
 D. Posel, ‘The apartheid project, –’, in R. Ross, A. K. Mager, and
B. Nasson (eds.), The Cambridge History of South Africa: Volume , –
(Cambridge, ), –.
 M. Legassick, ‘Legislation, ideology and economy in post- South Africa’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, : (), –.
 Ibid. , discussing his diﬀerences with Wolpe.
 A. Ashforth, The Politics of Oﬃcial Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa
(Oxford, ).
 D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid, –: Conﬂict and Compromise
(Oxford, ); P. L. Bonner, P. Delius, and D. Posel (eds.), Apartheid’s Genesis, –
 (Johannesburg, ); T. D. Moodie, ‘The South African state and industrial
conﬂict in the s’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, : (),
–; I. T. Evans, Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa
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often scrutinised for evidence of dramatic change after , although
more as an instance of the NP’s determination rapidly to ‘Afrikanerise’ the
state, ‘both to provide jobs and to ensure a pliant bureaucracy’, and at
the cost, it is also implied, of its eﬃciency. The armed services were
symbolically important given their recent role in a war the NP had opposed,
and the strongly republican defence minister, Frans Erasmus, made an
example of a military establishment he feared was too close to Smuts’s pro-
imperial United Party (UP), removing ‘the best-trained and most-educated
oﬃcers’.
There was more, however, to ‘Afrikanerisation’ than the wholesale
replacement of English-speakers or UP-aligned oﬃcials by Afrikaners or
NP supporters. Because administration, certainly as recorded in the archives,
was overwhelmingly conducted in English before  and in Afrikaans
afterwards, it is insuﬃciently recognised that Afrikaners were already
preponderant in the civil service when the NP took power. This was
graphically conveyed to me by the daughters of the commissioner of police at
the time:
Before the end of the war we were in Pretoria, which is civil service
completely. . . . It was to my mind an English town, and I was in Johannesburg
studying art when the Nats got in. And I used to go home every weekend. And you
know that, overnight, it turned into an Afrik . . . there must have been thousands of
closet Afrikaners, because overnight, in the shops, wherever you went, it was all
Afrikaans. It was literally overnight. . . .Everybody suddenly started to speak
Afrikaans.
Some of this chameleon-like behaviour may have been opportunistic
identiﬁcation with the Nationalists. Mostly, however, it reﬂected a truth
about performance, discipline, and ethnic and political identiﬁcation at
diﬀerent levels of the civil service that Lord Harlech, Britain’s high
commissioner in South Africa, had observed in :
but for the loyalty and capacity of a dozen senior civil servants, about half of them
of English, and the [other] half of Afrikaner, descent, accustomed to co-operation
with the British after the Boer War, it is very doubtful if General Smuts and his
Cabinet could have harnessed the administrative machine to the war eﬀort without
a degree of opposition or passive obstruction which could not have been tolerated,
(Berkeley, ); K. Breckenridge, ‘Verwoerd’s bureau of proof: total information in the
making of apartheid’, History Workshop Journal, : (), –.
 W. Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (nd edn, Oxford, ), ; Posel,
‘The apartheid’, ; D. Posel, ‘Whiteness and power in the South African civil service:
paradoxes of the apartheid state’, Journal of Southern African Studies, : (), –.
 I. van der Waag, ‘Smuts’s generals: towards a ﬁrst portrait of the South African high
command, –’,War in History, : (), .
 A. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa (London, ), ,
on the military and the police, while Evans notes that ‘Afrikaner names already heavily
dominated [NAD personnel] listings for ’, Evans, Bureaucracy, . Names are only
roughly indicative of their bearers’ ﬁrst language and are no key to party political
aﬃliation.
 Interview with A.M. Marais and C. McLennan, Bedfordview,  Sept. .
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but the suppression of which would probably have brought the whole machine to a
standstill.
Harlech clearly thought the state was already substantially composed of anti-
war Afrikaners. His assessment that senior oﬃcers could steer the ‘adminis-
trative machine’ was premature, for the OB’s police Stormjaer brigade
would seriously test their leadership. But many other Afrikaners in the police
and wider public service were indeed willing to wait, and governments on
both sides of  settled for at least an appearance of politically neutral
professionalism among state oﬃcials.
Erasmus aside, if ministers after  largely ‘abided by the rules of
seniority’ in retaining or promoting senior oﬃcials who, although possibly
unobtrusively UP-inclined, showed suﬃcient commitment to the new
government’s policies, or maintained the conceit that they were primarily
professionals serving the state rather than any particular government, was
‘Afrikanerisation’ for the NP not then more about directing the existing
bureaucracy than its qualitative transformation? Certainly in the South
African Police (SAP), unlike the military, the Nationalists interfered little
with the top ranks and mostly observed Smuts’s  precedent in handing
the commissionership to the most senior oﬃcer in line. This accounts for the
rapid turnover of commissioners of police in the period  to  – there
were six, compared to two for the period  to  when civilian outsiders
led the force – as those at the top soon reached the mandatory retirement age.
The SAP’s relevance to the issue of continuity and change in the apartheid
state is evident in the stability of signiﬁcant elements of its personnel from the
s through the s; the numerical superiority of Afrikaners among
whites in both its lower and oﬃcer ranks before ; its experience of
wartime internal political division, which was mainly a division among
Afrikaners and hence seldom openly mentioned if far from forgotten after
; and its prominence within the state both before and during apartheid.
In –, the SAP’s , regular staﬀ represented a quarter of all
permanent central government employees (,) excluding the railways.
This ﬁgure was almost double the number working for Native Aﬀairs (,)
and Defence (,) combined; only the post oﬃce had more permanent staﬀ
(,). The SAP’s growth from , men in  to , in  – at
least half of which happened before the NP took oﬃce –was proportional to
public service enlargement as a whole, meaning the police’s relative size
within the state remained constant. Two other key developments within
the SAP during this postwar decade – again both well under way before
 –were the rising percentage of black police in its overall strength from
· to ·, and the formal establishment of a discrete Special Branch to deal
with political matters.
 The National Archives, London (TNA), Records of the Cabinet Oﬃce (CAB) //
, Harlech to Cranborne,  Aug. .
 Evans, Bureaucracy,  and –, referring to the NAD.
 Union of South Africa, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Oﬃcial Year Book of the
Union and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland, No. –
(Pretoria, ), –; Union of South Africa, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Oﬃcial
Year Book of the Union and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland,
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While the Cold War and decolonisation internationally – and the
transition to apartheid, economic expansion, and growing black nationalist
resistance domestically – help explain post- developments within the
SAP, they are not the whole story. They are what the police told
themselves and others oﬃcially – a Parsonian narrative of organic insti-
tutional enlargement and specialisation in response to changing circum-
stances. I argue that the internal dynamics, institutional arrangements,
and capacity of the force that confronted the state’s opponents in the early
apartheid era grew out of the intra-police conﬂicts of the Second World
War and how they were managed subsequently. To illustrate this
argument, I consider the careers of speciﬁc policemen, showing how they
experienced the divisions from the inside, responded to the war, and later
fared in its aftermath. These proﬁles cast new light on one of the most
controversial state bureaucracies of mid-twentieth-century South Africa;
reveal the complexities of ‘Afrikanerisation’ in the public service; and link
the state’s responses to its most determined opponents before and after
.
T H E P O L I C E AND TH E S E COND WORLD WAR
In September , Smuts narrowly won a parliamentary vote in favour
of declaring war on Germany. For nationalistic Afrikaners, who wanted
neutrality, Smuts’s government lacked legitimacy, and while most supported
the NP’s constitutionalist opposition to the war, many others, having
lost faith in electoral institutions, ﬂocked to the extra-parliamentary
OB, possibly the largest organisation of its kind in pre-s South
African political history. The OB had been founded as a cultural body
during the  centenary of the Great Trek, but assumed an openly
militant anti-government posture once the Nazi-sympathising and charis-
matic J. F. J. van Rensburg resigned as administrator of the Orange Free State
at the end of  to become its commandant-general and leader of the
Stormjaers.
Participation in the war was unpopular with many white policemen, a
substantial majority of whom by this time were Afrikaners. A former
Johannesburg detective told me that his immediate colleagues were split right
down the middle: ‘ per cent . . .were sympathetic to the war eﬀort, the other
 per cent were dead against it’. Many of the latter became OB members
before this was prohibited in the SAP in November . The SAP
implemented internment orders, which many policemen disliked, particu-
larly once the initial focus on ‘enemy subjects’ and leftwingers gave way to
No. –– (Pretoria, ), –. See also J. D. Brewer, Black and Blue: Policing in
South Africa (Oxford, ),  and .
 M. de W. Dippenaar, The History of the South African Police, – (Silverton,
South Africa, ), –; Posel, ‘Whiteness’, –.
 H. Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (Cape Town, ), –,
surveys the literature on Afrikaners’ responses to the war.
 Dippenaar, The History, –.
 Interview with C.W. Pattle, Magaliesburg,  Nov. .
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concerns about the reliability of public servants and the inﬁltration of the
state by anti-war republicans. The harsh discipline instilled during the
 year commissionership of I. P. de Villiers might have suﬃced to keep
policemen at their unpopular tasks. Given its size, composition, and
visibility it was always possible that the police would be politically riven,
but the likelihood increased when the army approached the SAP for a
ﬁghting brigade. Because legislation made policemen liable for call-up only
in South Africa itself, De Villiers asked for volunteers for service
anywhere in Africa. Volunteers signed a document known as the ‘Africa’
or ‘Red’ oath because they were issued orange shoulder tabs – or ‘rooi
lussies’ in Afrikaans – and were derided by opponents of the war as ‘rooi
luisies’ (‘little red lice’). The tabs distinguished the small majority of
volunteers from those who did not sign and whose loyalty to the
government and its war policy were thus questioned. In law-enforcement
operations – notably some very public conﬂicts between soldiers and the
OB in Johannesburg in early  – the actions of the police, and of those
wearing or not wearing orange tabs, were scrutinised for evidence of
partisanship. In October , De Villiers was seconded to the Union
Defence Force to command the Second South African Infantry Division,
of which the Police Brigade formed part. At SAP headquarters this left
his considerably less eﬀectual English-speaking chief deputy, G. R. C.
Baston, in charge.
Until the invasion of France, oﬃcials were complacent about ‘the dangers
of Fifth Column activities’ and ‘the possibility of internal sabotage and
communication with the enemy from South Africa’. InMay , however,
Smuts created a cabinet-level ‘Internal Security Committee’ under Interior
Minister Harry Lawrence ‘to co-ordinate all information’ concerning
‘subversive and other activities against the interest of the State’.
Confusion in reporting and jurisdiction resulted, and that October Smuts
directed that any information ‘regarding subversive, disloyal or suspicious
activities of any person within or outside the Union, including public
servants’, was ‘to be sent immediately to one point only’, Colonel
(subsequently Brigadier) H. J. Lenton, the postmaster-general and controller
of censorship, whose Intelligence Clearance (later Records) Bureau was ‘made
responsible . . . for the allocation of any such information to the proper quarter
 CAD, Secretary for Native Aﬀairs Archives (NTS) /, Chief Control Oﬃcer
(CCO) to All Control Oﬃcers in the Union, General Minute No.  of , ‘Subversive
Propaganda’,  Nov. .
 Dippenaar, The History, .
 Visser, OB, –; Dippenaar, The History, –; Seegers, The Military, ;
D. Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa: South Africa in Perspective (Berkeley, ),
–; O. Geyser et al., Die Nasionale Party, Deel : Van Oorlog tot Oorwinning, –
 (Bloemfontein, ), .
 F.W. Cooper, The Police Brigade: th S. A. Infantry Brigade, – (Cape Town,
), .
 Union of South Africa, Report of the Select Committee on German Foreign Oﬃce
Documents (Conduct of Member) (Cape Town, ),  and , paras. , and ,.
 Ibid. , para. ,; M. C. van Deventer, ‘Die ontwikkeling van ’n militêre
inligtingsvermoë vir die Unieverdedigingsmag, –’, Scientia Militaria: South
African Journal of Military Studies, : (), .
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for appropriate action’. The implicit lack of conﬁdence in the SAP’s
dependability signalled by this controversial decision appeared to be
corroborated as reports came in from around the country throughout the
early s of unreliable police, and inﬁltration of other state organs by OB,
pro-Nazi and anti-war agents. At the peak of the politicisation of wartime
policing, Acting Commissioner Baston told a press conference that ‘it was
vitally essential to clean up the Police Force’; and Secretary for Native
Aﬀairs Douglas Smit cautioned a subordinate he had asked to investigate
alleged subversive propaganda among Africans: ‘in view of the fact that there
are so many disloyal men in the Police you should act independently of
them’.
The SAP alone, however, had the trained personnel and legal authority
systematically to investigate such reports of ‘subversion’ or candidates for
internment, and eﬀorts to bypass individual oﬃcers considered deﬁnitely
untrustworthy often led only to dependence on other policemen who were
possibly untrustworthy. As the chief control oﬃcer (who oversaw intern-
ments) noted, ‘[a]ll [his] investigations were done through the police. [He]
had only an oﬃce staﬀ . . . no outside agents whatsoever’. Even Lenton’s
Bureau was allowed only the tiniest ﬁeld staﬀ, for Smuts thought Lenton’s
ambitions ‘smacked of the Gestapo’.
Clearly white policemen’s loyalties were deeply divided during the war, but
their individual dispositions were expressed in or informed by a limited
number of variables: whether they took the ‘Africa’ oath, and, if they did,
whether they went up north; whether, if they stayed behind, they were
interned on suspicion of being OB members, or, if not interned, they
participated in the arrests and interrogation of their colleagues; whether they
were in the uniform or the detective branch; and whether they were oﬃcers or
in the lower ranks. Which side individuals took during the war is clearest in
two groups of policemen: those, like H. J. van den Bergh, dismissed for active
disloyalty or forced to resign because of membership in organisations deemed
incompatible with police service, and reinstated by the Nationalists after
; and those who zealously pursued the ﬁrst group. Many cases, however,
were more ambiguous and the loyalties of policemen, even in the highest
ranks, were tested on both sides of .
WA R S E R V I C E A ND I NT E RNMENT : S CH I SM I N TH E LOWE R R ANK S
Although the call for volunteers to serve abroad visibly divided the SAP, the
principal rift came later among pro- and anti-war policemen who stayed
behind. Rocco de Villiers, who joined the SAP in  and became a physical
education instructor at the police training depot in Pretoria, took the oath
when war came, worked brieﬂy on the Johannesburg ‘political staﬀ’ interning
 CAD JUS //, H. G. Lawrence, Minister of the Interior, to SJ,  Oct. ;
K. Fedorowich, ‘German espionage and British counter-intelligence in South Africa and
Mozambique, –’, Historical Journal, : (), –.
 See reports in CAD NTS /.  Dippenaar, The History, .
 CAD NTS /, D. L. Smit to C. P. Alport,  Feb. .
 Union of South Africa, Report of the Select Committee, , para. .
 TNA Records of the Security Service (KV) /, ‘Appendix’, .
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‘enemy subjects’, underwent military training, and then served in the
Western Desert from . He did not feel his war record disadvantaged
him. The Nationalists, he said, distinguished between overseas service, which
was not held against one, and ‘home’ service. ‘My service’, he said,
was disliked, but was tolerable, but those who worked for the government . . .were
really hated. The ‘Smuts dogs’, as they were referred to by the Afrikaans media.
That form of hatred spilled over afterwards, when the Nationalist government took
over.
Policemen who were on ‘home’ internment duty for long enough to
experience directly the open division with colleagues arrested for involvement
in OB subversion, but who were very junior when war came, and kept their
heads down after , also fared reasonably well. Even so, the schism
profoundly and permanently aﬀected them, and left them, unlike those who
served overseas, feeling undervalued. This was the experience of Cecil Pattle,
who joined the police in , transferred to the CID in , and was
working in Johannesburg at the beginning of the war. Pattle ‘took the oath to
ﬁght’ in  but, being a detective, was not permitted to join the army. He
described to me what happened at Marshall Square, Johannesburg’s CID
headquarters, on  January  when his OB colleagues were detained:
[W]e were instructed, at such and such a time, we’ve got to be at Marshall
Square . . . supposedly a kit inspection. We used to have these once a year . . .On this
particular day . . .we all formed up and we had our kit laid out in front of us. And
then the oﬃcer in command came along and he said, ‘These men take two steps
forward’, and I was amongst them. We had to take two steps forward. And then he
said, ‘Now the men in the front rank, the men who’ve stepped forward, about turn’.
And we did an about turn. And then he said, ‘Arrest the guy immediately opposite
you’. Honest, this is what happened. We arrested, ah, there must have been about
 chaps we arrested. They were all chaps who were anti-war, and they were taken
oﬀ and sorted out, and interned. . . .We came out. Now we had to go and take them
to their houses and search . . .And as we went out, to our motorbikes, this Scottish
regiment was ranged right around Marshall Square with ﬁxed bayonets.
Although Pattle eventually reached high rank, retiring as a brigadier in ,
he felt uncomfortable once the Nationalists reinstated the policemen interned
in . Pattle believed he was disadvantaged in relation both to those who
had fought overseas, and to the reinstated men, who sought accelerated
promotion to make up for lost years of service and in ‘a political decision’were
‘granted commissioned rank without passing the examinations. And that held
us out, the chaps who were doing the work, . . .which caused a lot of ill
feeling.’ These wartime divisions within the SAP, and the resentments they
bred, lasted many decades:
There was a tension up until the time I left the force. You know, there’s ‘Oh,
they’re OB’, and we knew them. . . .Those in positions were not pushed out [after
], but those ﬁlling vacancies were pushed up. They were brought from these
blokes who had been discharged and interned and given commissions, made
 Interview with R. de Villiers, Cape Town, Nov. ; R. de Villiers, responses to
follow-up written questions,  Oct. .
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lieutenants. . . . [T]hat impression was left that these chaps were naturally favoured
because they reckoned they’d been badly treated, . . . these OB guys who came back.
I cannot say because quite a few of these chaps who had taken the oath and fought
up north did quite well afterwards too. . . . but there’s the strong feeling that the
blokes who hadn’t taken the oath were favoured.
H. J. van den Bergh, who joined the SAP in , was one of these
‘favoured’ men; certainly his post- trajectory seems to bear out Pattle’s
complaint. When the NP came in, Van den Bergh led ‘some of his old
Koﬃefontein police colleagues’ in successfully petitioning for reinstatement,
and was promoted from second-class detective sergeant to detective head
constable within two days of re-enlisting in August . The former
internees’ break in service was ‘condoned’ as a ‘special leave of absence’ and
‘[t]en of the most senior’ were allowed to take the examination for
commissioned rank. Van den Bergh thus received his commission in March
, whereas Pattle had to wait until  to become a detective head
constable and until  to be commissioned. Unsurprisingly, Van den Bergh
recalled that the ex-internees experienced ‘tremendous enmity’ after rejoining
the police.
Van den Bergh’s account of the arrests at Marshall Square on  January
 corroborates Pattle’s except he believed ‘that the one row of detectives
knew what this was all about while we knew nothing’. From Koﬃefontein
in September , Van den Bergh addressed a letter, signed by  other low-
ranking policemen, to the minister of justice explaining ‘from [their] point
of view’ the circumstances leading to their arrest, and requesting their
release and reinstatement. The  conceded that most had belonged to the
OB ‘during its existence as a Cultural Organisation’, but said they had
resigned their membership once it was forbidden in the SAP. Yet Lieutenant
G. E. Diedericks, the CID investigating oﬃcer (who was later particularly
reviled by Nationalists), had refused to accept their denials that they were part
of a Stormjaer unit planning a coup, while believing the statements of other
policemen since released and reinstated.
Responding, Acting Commissioner Baston detailed in turn the evidence
against each of the  that he believed proved the ‘genuineness’ of the seized
Stormjaer lists. Even while ‘protesting his innocence’, Baston argued, Van
den Bergh was ‘actually engaged in Stormjaer activities in [Koﬃefontein]
camp’. Baston observed that police membership in the OB had been
prohibited in November . Only later, in early , had ‘the Stormjaer
Organization [come] into being’ and secretly recruited policemen. Some of
those initially detained had indeed been released for lack of evidence, but the
 were among those ‘in whose cases the entries in [the brigade leader’s]
records were corroborated’ and whose internment was thus merited. They
 Interview with Pattle.
 D’Oliveira, Vorster, ; The Nongqai, : (), ,; The Nongqai, :
(), ,.
 Pensions (Supplementary) Act, No.  of , Schedule, Section ; D’Oliveira,
Vorster, ; The Nongqai, : (), ; interview with Pattle.
 D’Oliveira, Vorster, – and .
 CAD JUS //, CCO to SJ,  Oct. , encl. H. J. van den Bergh et al. to
Minister of Justice (MJ),  Sept. .
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had ‘reorganised their Stormjaer ranks in camp’ and ‘any leniency shown
towards them would be misplaced and to the detriment of the safety and
security of the State’.
Van den Bergh’s petition and Baston’s response suggest that many
policemen who occupied senior ranks within the OB held relatively junior
ranks in the SAP. This inversion accounts for some of the tensions within
both the OB and the SAP and explains why many who were refused release
from internment were among the lowest-ranking members of the SAP.
Possibly the lower ranks in the SAP had less to lose by identifying themselves
wholeheartedly with the OB; certainly a much higher percentage, Afrikaners
included, of the commissioned than of the non-commissioned ranks signed
the ‘Africa’ oath. By such outward shows of loyalty, or sitting on the fence,
oﬃcers with republican, anti-war, or anti-British sympathies prevented a
more fundamental schism that might have left the SAP less able institution-
ally to accommodate the charged post- ‘hatred’, ‘tension’, and ‘enmity’
recalled respectively by Rocco de Villiers, Pattle, and Van den Bergh.
AV E R T I NG S CH I SM AT TH E TO P : C O LON E L CO E T Z E E
AND H I S P ROT ÉG É S
A few Nationalist-leaning oﬃcers resigned because of the war policy, but
many more remained in the SAP and negotiated the competing claims of their
professional, political, and personal commitments. No instance of such tested
loyalties was as ambiguous, layered, or, given the importance of his oﬃce,
as signiﬁcant as that of Jacobus Johannes (‘Bill’) Coetzee, the CID chief
ultimately responsible for arresting and investigating ‘disloyal’ police in early
. Coetzee is especially diﬃcult to characterise because he died in 
and therefore played no potentially revealing role after . However, his
decisions in delegating wartime responsibilities to protégés he had cultivated
during postings in Pretoria and Cape Town in the s signiﬁcantly shaped
the SAP’s post- leadership and therefore enhance Coetzee’s status as a
pivotal ﬁgure in this account.
Born in , Coetzee joined the Transvaal Police in  as a ‘plain
clothes constable’. He moved slowly through the non-commissioned ranks,
ﬁnally being appointed a sub-inspector (lieutenant) in . Then, in a period
when promotion rates in the CID were ‘abnormally rapid’, he became an
inspector (captain) in  and Transvaal divisional criminal investigation
oﬃcer (DCIO) based in Pretoria; chief inspector (major) in , transferring
to the Cape Western division as DCIO in ; and lieutenant-colonel and
CID chief at headquarters in  following the Police Inquiry Commission’s
recommendation that the post, vacant since , should be ﬁlled to ensure a
Union-wide ‘co-ordinating and controlling authority for criminal investi-
gation matters in direct touch with the Commissioner’. His rise, which his
 Ibid. Baston to SJ,  Oct. .
 Dippenaar, The History,  and .
 CAD Police Inquiry Commission Archives (K),  Jan. , J. J. Coetzee, ,;
Ibid.  Apr. , J. T. Clarke, ,–; Ibid.  May , I. P. de Villiers, , (for
‘abnormally rapid’ promotion in the CID); Union of South Africa, Interim and Final
Reports of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed by His Excellency the Governor-General to
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close subordinates clearly thought was merited, drew adverse comment
from older English-speaking oﬃcers whom he overtook in rank. One
attributed Coetzee’s success to his ‘having a nice [that is, Afrikaner] name’ – a
disparaging remark of a sort that Coetzee and other Afrikaners working their
way up the police hierarchy by the s undoubtedly encountered often and
resented.
Before the war, the SAP was the government’s chief intelligence agency,
and Coetzee, as CID deputy commissioner at headquarters, was the
commissioner’s staﬀ oﬃcer for counter-espionage, ‘[s]ubversive movements
and communist activities’. During the war, however, domestic and foreign
intelligence rivals, beginning with the aforementioned controller of censor-
ship, Lenton, not only questioned the broader police’s reliability but sowed
suspicion about Coetzee particularly. Coetzee’s responses to these challenges
led his rivals to label him a ‘staunchly anti-British Afrikaner’ and the ‘“cause
of most frustrations of allied intelligence operations”’ in Southern Africa.
They claimed he was a member of the secretive Afrikaner Broederbond
(AB) – an organisation promoting the interests and leadership of republican-
minded Afrikaners in all spheres of society – and closely associated with Van
Rensburg and the OB. Their evidence for Coetzee’s links to the AB and OB
was circumstantial or hearsay. Although their charge of ‘strong anti-British
bias’ was better founded, it did not necessarily indicate more than a jealous
protectiveness of the prerogatives of South African institutions.
The rivals’ suspicions surfaced in early , after the internment of
the police on the Witwatersrand, and in the midst of the OB’s retaliatory
sabotage campaign, both of which reﬂected badly on theCID and onCoetzee’s
leadership. Coetzee’s obstruction of his rivals’ operations, rather than
signalling ideological commitment to the OB or to the German cause, likely
originated in these personally and professionally mortifying circumstances.
Disentangling the two is diﬃcult, however, for there is indirect evidence that
Coetzee did aid the OB after January . Vorster, interned in September
, hinted that Coetzee had warned him that he was being watched. Yet if
the OB had contacts in the SAP through Coetzee, then equally Coetzee
had information from OB sources, and necessarily so for the Leibbrandt case
had seen lower-ranking policemen prevent ‘senior oﬃcers [from being]
informed of [Leibbrandt’s] presence’. Certainly Coetzee enjoyed the
conﬁdence of Acting Commissioner Baston, whom Smuts described as, ‘if
not of the highest intelligence, . . . thoroughly loyal and true as steel’. And
Inquire into Certain Matters Concerning the South African Police and the South African
Railways and Harbours Police (Pretoria, ), , paras. –.
 CAD K,  Apr. , U. R. Boberg, ,.
 Ibid.  Apr. , J. T. Clarke, ,.
 CADArchives of the South African Police (SAP) //, Palmer to Secretary, Public
Service Commission (PSC),  Jan. .  Fedorowich, ‘German’, .
 TNA KV /, ‘Southern Africa’,  (footnote),  and ‘Appendix’, ;
J. S. Chavkin, ‘British intelligence and the Zionist, South African, and Australian
intelligence communities during and after the Second World War’ (unpublished PhD
thesis, University of Cambridge, ), –.  Chavkin, ‘British’, , note .
 D’Oliveira, Vorster, .  Dippenaar, The History, .
 TNA KV /, A, Copy of Minute from Director-General,  Nov. .
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I. P. de Villiers, the indisputably pro-war commissioner seconded to the
military, insisted he was ‘completely satisﬁed as to COETZEE’s loyalty’.
Coetzee’s loyalty was also accepted by reliable lower-ranking oﬃcers.
Johannes Taillard recalled reporting directly to Coetzee in early  when
working undercover in South West Africa ‘to gather information about Nazi
activities’, but did not question Coetzee’s wartime record. In , Taillard
again acted covertly, to capture Leibbrandt. Taillard’s plan required Baston
and Coetzee’s support, which again shows that, whoever did the preparatory
work, the execution of operations usually depended on the SAP. Taillard did
not say the chiefs themselves were unreliable, but warned that their oﬃces
were ‘full of informers’. George Cloete Visser, Lieutenant Diedericks’s
assistant in interviewing Van den Bergh and his comrades at Koﬃefontein,
distinguished between Coetzee’s demeanour and that of future Commissioner
Cornelius Ignatius Rademeyer. Called to headquarters in February 
during the OB sabotage campaign, Visser heard Rademeyer, who ‘had been
brought up from Kimberley to supervise the investigation and interrogation
of those in custody’, declare it ‘“against [his] conscience to have to prosecute
[his] fellow-Afrikaners”’. Rademeyer apparently ‘had a stormy session with
Colonel Bill Coetzee, but it did not aﬀect his career in the police’. Was
Coetzee’s tolerance of Rademeyer’s dissent an instance of subversion, of
partiality towards a pre- protégé, or of that wiser forbearance by senior
oﬃcials which, as Lord Harlech had implied, kept the state ‘harnessed . . . to
the war eﬀort’? And had Coetzee hoped that Rademeyer would accept the
assignment for one or more of the same reasons?
Coetzee died in July  and was buried along with the possible motives
for his actions – an ambition to rise to the top of his profession and become
commissioner of police, resentment of anti-Afrikaner prejudice, sympathy
with the militant republican cause, a determination to frustrate the rivals who
suspected him, and his police organisational tribalism. Coetzee’s wartime
loyalties were tested in a very intimate sense too. His son-in-law, D. A. Bester,
who himself eventually retired as head of the CID in the early s, took the
oath in , was an investigator in the  Stormjaer coup plot, and
testiﬁed in the treason case that followed; there was ‘loyalty’ in one part of
Coetzee’s immediate family.His older son John, however, also a policeman,
who enlisted to ﬁght overseas and later joined the Special Branch, was
rumoured to have ‘been practically disinherited by his father’ for ‘work[ing]
with the Germans and . . . broadcast[ing] anti-British propaganda’ while held
prisoner of war. The sources say only that Coetzee died ‘suddenly . . . “from
natural causes”’, suggesting a heart attack or fatal stroke. Subjecting him to
tremendous professional, political, and personal strains, his wartime trials and
 TNA KV /, ‘Southern Africa’,  (capitals in original).
 South African Police Service (SAPS) Museum, Pretoria, ///, Statement of
Johannes Taillard Made to Captain J. Hurter, Olifantsfontein,  Mar. .
 Strydom, For Volk, .
 Visser, OB, –.
 CAD SAP //, encl. in Deputy Commissioner (Decompol), Johannesburg, to
Commissioner of Police (Compol),  July ; Visser, OB,  and .
 P. C. Swanepoel, ‘The South African Police during and after the SecondWorld War’
(unpublished document emailed by Swanepoel to author,  Apr. ).
 TNA KV /, ‘Southern Africa’, ; The Nongqai, : (), .
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choices defeated him physically, but lastingly inﬂuenced the careers of the
protégés to whom he delegated, or that he prudently exempted from,
controversial tasks. A few – conspicuous ‘Smuts dogs’, in Rocco de Villiers’s
phrase, including Diedericks, Visser, and Taillard, whose zeal in pursuing the
OB perceptibly exceeded the requirements of neutral professionalism –
experienced retarded promotion after Smuts’s government fell in , and
resigned from the SAP during the s.Others, however, including Bester
and Rademeyer, eventually reached the highest ranks of the force.
T H E L I N E AMENT S O F CONT I NU I T Y F ROM TH E    S TH ROUGH
THE     S : ‘ P RO F E S S I O N A L I SM ’ , T H E S P E C I A L B R ANCH ,
A ND TH E SU P E R S E S S I O N O F WART IM E D I V I S I O N
Rademeyer’s is perhaps the least complicated case of continuity in the SAP’s
highest ranks in the transition to NP rule. His refusals to take the ‘Africa’
oath, investigate ‘ﬁfth column’ activity, or interrogate policemen interned in
January  were celebrated in the apartheid era. In addition to enjoying
Coetzee’s protection, Rademeyer, who joined the SAP in  and was
commissioned a decade later, was a skilled detective, and his protests did not
slow his promotion under Smuts even after his mentor’s death. An inspector
in , Rademeyer was appointed a chief inspector in , deputy
commissioner in , head of the CID in , and ﬁnally commissioner
of police in .
Robert John (‘Bobby’) Palmer’s continuation in his post as commissioner
for three years under the Nationalists was less straightforward. A member of
the SAP from its formation in , Palmer was commissioned in  and
posted around the country before becoming commandant ﬁrst of the canine
facility outside Pretoria and then of the recruits’ training depot. A ‘people’s
person’ according to his daughters, Palmer’s ‘authority rested on the respect
and aﬀection which he naturally evoked. There were very few oﬃcers or men
who did not take to him.’ Raised to deputy commissioner in , he was in
command of the Cape Western division by September . Palmer led the

st Police Battalion during training and internment camp duty during 
and into war in North Africa in . He was made a brigade commander
in , and remained abroad until July , returning from Italy shortly
before becoming commissioner in succession to I. P. de Villiers, who
apparently recommended him for the oﬃce.
Palmer’s politics, which could be inferred from his British settler Eastern
Cape background and his service record, meant that his loyalties were more
tested after  than before, but he managed to work with the Nationalists
by adopting an attitude of neutral professionalism. It helped too that most of
his war service had been overseas and that his congenial personality enabled
 De Villiers, responses; Strydom, For Volk, .
 Visser, OB, –; Dippenaar, The History, .
 Proﬁle based on interview with Marais and McLennan; G. Butler, Bursting World:
An Autobiography, – (Cape Town, ), ; ‘Personality parade’, Indaba (August
), –,  and ; R. Norval, ‘General Palmer’s life story – I’, Cape Times Magazine,
undated [ July ?]; copies of other undated press cuttings kindly shown to me by
Mrs McLennan.
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him to establish a rapport with Justice Minister C. R. Swart. Palmer’s
daughters told me:
He was always a Smuts supporter, but as you know the Nationalists came in when
he was Commissioner, and there was never any thought of him not remaining
on. . . .And when he left the police force, both the United Party and the Nationalist
Party asked him to stand for them. So that’s how neutral he kept his [politics]. He
maintained that if you were a public servant, you served the government in power
and you kept your political leanings to yourself. . . .And he really got on very well
with Blackie Swart.
The NP might have preferred the commitment of oﬃcers like
Rademeyer, but it was prepared to settle for, and indeed publicly made
much of, the professional respectability and continuity that Palmer and
other remaining English-speakers at the apex of the state bureaucracy gave
it early on in its rule. For the SAP, at least linguistically, was
already substantially ‘Afrikanerised’; its archives suggest that Palmer’s oﬃce
by  was a rapidly shrinking islet of English in a sea of Afrikaans. This
makes the loyalties of many of the senior oﬃcers who stayed behind in
South Africa during the war years – but who were both less forthright than
Rademeyer in expressing dissent from the war policy, and less visibly zealous
than the ‘Smuts dogs’ in supporting it –more diﬃcult to categorise than
Palmer’s.
Hendrik Jacobus du Plooy, another of Coetzee’s protégés and executor of
the CID chief’s estate when he died, exempliﬁes the signiﬁcance of key
personnel from the war years in the creation of policing capabilities
commonly associated with the apartheid era. Du Plooy, whose career closely
shadowed Rademeyer’s, joined the SAP in , became a detective in ,
was commissioned in , and received all his subsequent promotions in
tandem with Rademeyer, becoming head of the CID in , and eventually
also succeeding Rademeyer as commissioner in . Du Plooy was hand-
picked by Coetzee to supervise the investigations of the OB when Rademeyer
refused the role. Thus, in Du Plooy came from Grahamstown, where he
was Eastern Cape DCIO, to Pretoria ‘for special service’, in recognition of
which he was asked in  to head a new Special Branch (SB). ‘All ﬁles on
Communism were handed over to me with the instruction from then on to
combat Communism more actively – on account of [my] previous experi-
ence.’
The SB therefore evolved from Coetzee’s wartime ‘special staﬀ . . .
established at Pretoria for the purpose of investigating subversive [mainly
Afrikaner extremist] matters’. In May , Du Plooy assembled former
members of this staﬀ into a team of  oﬃcers and NCOs who were thereafter,
as Commissioner Palmer put it at the beginning of , ‘continuously
engaged . . . in the United Kingdom, Europe and South Africa in the
 Interview with Marais and McLennan.
 G. R. Berridge, ‘The ethnic “agent in place”: English-speaking civil servants and
Nationalist South Africa, –’, Intelligence and National Security, : (), –.
 Quotations and career details from SAPS Museum, ///, Verklaring van
Luitenant-Generaal H. J. du Plooy,  Feb. .
 Visser, OB, ; Brewer, Black, .
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investigation of War Crimes, communist activities, [and] European and
Native agitators engaged in stirring up industrial strife’. Fear of
white republican conspiracies – former wartime internees ‘remain[ed] a
source of danger to the State’, Palmer wrote – segued into seeing ‘commun-
ism’ behind every local strike and protest. Alluding to an ‘enormous ﬁeld’ of
subversive activity, Palmer justiﬁed the perpetuation and enlargement of
Du Plooy’s team and formalised its status as a discrete SAP branch. In ,
soon after the far-reaching Suppression of Communism Act became law,
Palmer projected that  white and black SB policemen of various ranks,
based in the country’s major urban centres and ‘focus[ing] their attention
exclusively on security work, mostly of an extremely conﬁdential nature’,
were the minimum required to eﬀectively counter ‘Communism . . . as well as
all other movements and evils that might threaten the safety of the State’.
‘Fly’ Du Plooy, as the SB head was known in the SAP, travelled abroad
twice in  and again in , , , and , sometimes leading a
larger study team, to confer with MI, Scotland Yard, and Commonwealth
police chiefs.
Du Plooy may have been a Nationalist before or prepared to identify
himself as one after . If so, he was far more discreet than his successor as
commissioner, J.M. Keevy, who had also served through the war and whose
pursuit of Broederbond membership became an open secret in the s.
Piet Swanepoel, who joined the Broederbond around , learned of
Keevy’s membership, but ‘never heard [Du Plooy] being spoken of as a
member. We assumed that he was a member of the Freemasons or one of
Harry Lawrence’s men.’ Lawrence was Smuts’s justice minister when Du
Plooy was establishing the SB. Also telling against Du Plooy’s Nationalist
credentials, in Swanepoel’s view, was his authorship ‘of the lectures we all
bought to prepare for the [promotions] exams . . . [which] were only available
in English, which was the reason why we all believed that Du Plooy was pro-
English’. Moreover, Du Plooy, alongside Diedericks and others with
‘leading parts in the investigation of the Leibbrandt, the Stormjaer and other
cases relating to subversive activity’, received the King’s Police Medal in
December , attracting the criticism ‘that they had been decorated by the
British for putting their fellow-Afrikaners behind bars and barbed wire’.
For organising security during the royal family’s visit to South Africa in ,
Du Plooy also accepted membership of the Royal Victorian Order and was
 CAD SAP //, Palmer to Secretary, PSC,  Jan. ; Visser, OB, .
 CAD SAP //, Palmer to Secretary, PSC,  Jan. .
 CAD SAP //, Palmer to MJ,  Oct. .
 Ibid.; Swanepoel, ‘The South African Police’; Chavkin, ‘British’, –;
Dippenaar, The History, –.
 J. H. P. Serfontein, Brotherhood of Power: An Exposé of the Secret Afrikaner
Broederbond (London, ), .
 Swanepoel, ‘The South African Police’. Du Plooy later prepared an Afrikaans edition
of his lectures: The Nongqai, : (), . But Rademeyer’s commissionership was
better remembered for his Standing Order conferring on policemen ‘the inalienable right
to draw up any document . . . in [their] mother tongue’. Dippenaar, The History, .
 Visser, OB, .
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unembarrassed about mentioning it later.Most telling was an early personal
tragedy:
I had never even thought about a career in the police until after the shocking events
of ··whenmy only brother, to whom I was very close, was shot dead during
the  strike on the Rand while performing his duties as a young policeman. The
suddenness and shock of this loss are even now indescribable. Gradually, however,
I became obsessed, possessed, with the idea of carrying on his good work which so
suddenly, overnight, was cut short. But my parents wouldn’t allow it and only
when I was  did I succeed in enlisting in the Force, with the help of the local
station commander . . . still without my parents’ approval.
For Nationalists, Smuts’s suppression of the  revolt signiﬁed, like
September , a betrayal of South African to imperial interests, and Du
Plooy’s self-identiﬁcation with it is revealing. Like Palmer and his own
brother, however, Du Plooy maintained that he ‘perform[ed] his duties as
a . . . policeman’, whoever governed. British High Commissioner Evelyn
Baring attributed Minister of Justice Swart’s suggestion that the SB head
might report directly to him to Du Plooy’s being ‘“a relative of Mr Swart and
a convinced Nationalist”’. Yet, given the SB chief’s record, distrust of Du
Plooy possibly better explains Swart’s thinking here.
Du Plooy’s case illustrates what is problematic about the ‘Afrikanerisation’
theme in the historiography of apartheid, which, partly originating in
prejudiced essentialising like Baring’s, hid the continuities in the policing of
anti-state resistance before and after . Pro-war or predominantly career-
oriented Afrikaners who remained in service after  responded defen-
sively, claiming a professional commitment to the ideal of non-political
policing – rarely to evade responsibility for the SAP’s highly politicised
control of blacks, but more often to reclothe their equally partisan wartime
bearing towards the Nationalists they now served. In contrast to Coetzee, who
trod an even ﬁner line, Du Plooy was apparently too ‘English’ for his fellow
Afrikaners, but like his predecessor he nonetheless remained too ‘Afrikaner’
for the English.
A ﬁnal pair, who illustrate particularly well the apartheid-era supersession
of the schism that had rent the wartime SAP, are Willem Carl Ernst
(‘Sampie’) Prinsloo and Abraham Theodorus (‘Att’) Spengler. Successive
heads of the SB on the Witwatersrand, they ﬁgure ubiquitously in writings
about the s. Singly or together, they presided over landmark episodes of
the time: the Sophiatown removals; the hounding of Drum magazine’s
reporters; the disruption of the Congress of the People at Kliptown in June
, at which the Freedom Charter was adopted; the Treason Trial that
followed; the secession of the Africanists from the ANC; and the Sharpeville
massacre on March . Spengler and Prinsloo are variously portrayed in
this literature. Both of course typify the increasing menace of apartheid
political policing, but also feature as representatives of a ﬁrst-generation SB
that gave way to an altogether diﬀerent organisation when Van den Bergh
 SAPS Museum ///, Verklaring van Luitenant-Generaal H. J. du Plooy,  Feb.
.
 Ibid.
 Chavkin, ‘British’, , citing Minute by Baring,  Dec. .
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took over on Prinsloo’s retirement in January . ‘However ﬁrm the old
type of policemen like Spengler were’, MK and SACP leader Joe Slovo later
wrote, ‘they were not torturers’; the ‘old-style security police . . .were
gentlemen’. Rand Daily Mail reporter Benjamin Pogrund explicitly
contrasted Spengler with Prinsloo, who at a prohibited gathering threatened
Pogrund with arrest while Spengler looked on ‘embarrassed’. Spengler,
Pogrund thought, ‘belonged to a dying breed, one of those Afrikaners who
had entered the police force during the Depression years of the s and who
viewed himself as a professional policeman. He told me that he had served
General Smuts, he was serving Dr Verwoerd, and he would serve Chief
Luthuli just as faithfully if the ANC ever came to power.’ Less blinkered
than Evelyn Baring in that they distinguished among Afrikaners, Slovo and
Pogrund nonetheless overstated the extent of generational change.
Drum writer Bloke Modisane also characterised Spengler and Prinsloo as
‘good cop, bad cop’, but with a clearer perception of the two oﬃcers’ common
purpose. Wishing to study abroad, and having applied for a passport that the
SB was delaying, Modisane secured an interview in Pretoria with Prinsloo,
‘a little man with a tight skin which seemed to stretch like elastic around the
cheek bones and the forehead’. Prinsloo ‘was extremely polite’, but
questioned Modisane about prominently reported incidents in which Drum
staﬀ had been ejected from whites-only churches. He promised to help
Modisane get a passport in return for information about ‘why the story
was done, whose idea it was’. Spengler, when Modisane saw him in
Johannesburg, ‘was equally courteous’, but although no more yielding than
Prinsloo his ‘approach was far more reasoned and realistic’. Spengler, Mike
Nicol notes, ‘stalks through Drum. There is a photograph of him, a large,
thick-set man in an open-necked shirt . . . and on this occasion without the
cigarette that’s usually held lightly between his lips’. Nicol’s interviewees
describe Spengler variously as having ‘a small bust of Hitler on his desk’; as ‘a
very wicked man . . . [who] did his job and did it thoroughly and concentrated
all his energies on it’; ‘as a ﬁgure of fun’ who met the Drum staﬀ and ANC
politicians ‘for a drink after work’; and ‘a nasty guy, no question about it, but
underneath he was a joke’. Prinsloo too betrayed the occasional ‘ﬁt of
generosity’, as when he allowed Nelson Mandela out of jail at weekends
 M. Nicol, A Good-Looking Corpse (London, ), ; D’Oliveira, Vorster, –;
P. H. Frankel, An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre (New Haven, CT,
),  and . They were also members of the Pretoria Police Rugby Club ﬁrst ﬁfteen
in the s (overlapping with Du Plooy, who had earlier played in the team with
Rademeyer) – a detail that adds point to their shared history of division and cooperation
before and after .
 J. Slovo, ‘The sabotage campaign’,Dawn, Souvenir Issue (), ; J. Slovo, Slovo:
The Unﬁnished Autobiography (Melbourne, ), .
 B. Pogrund, War of Words: Memoir of a South African Journalist (New York,
), .
 B. Modisane, Blame Me on History (London, ), . Swanepoel (email to
author,  June ) met Prinsloo ‘once or twice, but he was a quiet reserved man. He was
slim, of medium height and quite unassuming’.
 Modisane, Blame, – and –.
 Nicol, Good-Looking, –.
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during the Treason Trial to wind up the legal practice he had shared with
Oliver Tambo, who had gone into exile.
What does knowledge of these two policemen’s earlier careers, and
particularly of their wartime experience, contribute to our understanding of
their juxtaposition and their behaviour in these accounts? Born in about ,
Prinsloo was one of four brothers adopted from the Abraham-Kriel
Children’s Home in Langlaagte, Johannesburg, the oldest of whom became
a Nationalist MP and senator in the Vorster era. Prinsloo was not interned
as a suspected Stormjaer in January , but there was a break in his police
service from December  until  July , when along with Van den
Bergh and company he was reinstated. The beginning date suggests he was
dismissed or forced to resign because of Broederbond membership, which
Smuts prohibited in the civil service in December ; Serfontein listed a
‘Brigadier Prinsloo’ (the SB chief’s rank at retirement) as a Broeder living in
Johannesburg in the late s. Already commissioned by , Prinsloo
was promoted to inspector immediately upon reinstatement. He was the
SB’s Johannesburg head from  and, following Du Plooy’s elevation to
CID chief when Rademeyer became commissioner, was brought to Pretoria
to replace Du Plooy in . In Prinsloo, Rademeyer and Justice Minister
Swart now had someone more ideologically reliable, but not necessarily more
eﬀective, as national SB head than Du Plooy, with his team composed initially
of ‘Smuts dogs’, had been.
Spengler, by contrast, served continuously through the s. Born in
, he joined the SAP in  and took the oath in . His own
brother, A. C. Spengler, a uniform constable on the Witwatersrand, was
among those arrested on  January ; he was also one of the 
Koﬃefontein internees who signed Van den Bergh’s petition for release in
September . Reported as holding ‘pronounced anti-Government
views’, openly antagonistic towards soldiers, and boasting of his OB
membership, A. C. Spengler apparently ‘threatened to have his brother
D/Sgt. A. T. Spengler, whom he accuse[d] of having been the cause of his
internment, shot’. The brother beneﬁted from Van den Bergh’s eﬀorts to
have ‘his old Koﬃefontein police colleagues’ reinstated in . Yet it was
to ‘Att’ Spengler, by then a colonel, that Van den Bergh turned in  for
 N. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Boston,
), .
 L. du Plessis, ‘Oud-senator Prinsloo () in Pretoria oorlede’, Beeld (Johannesburg)
 Nov. , .  Act No.  of , Schedule, Section .
 Serfontein, Brotherhood, – and .  The Nongqai, : (), ,.
 Ibid. : (), , notes Prinsloo’s appointment as ‘Oﬃcer-in-Charge’
(Diedericks’s former position) at ‘The Grays’ (a building later synonymous with the SB
in Johannesburg). See also Ibid. : (), ; ‘Two days in London for Mr Swart’,The
Times (London),  Dec. , .
 CAD SAP //, F. J. Verster to Compol,  Aug. , encl. ‘“On Service”
Badges: Members of the Criminal Investigation Branch: List of Members Who Took New
Oath’.
 CAD JUS //: Coetzee to SJ,  Jan. , encl. lists of detainees’ names; CCO
to SJ,  Oct. , encl. H. J. van den Bergh et al. to MJ,  Sept. .
 Ibid. Baston to SJ,  Oct. .
 Act No.  of , Schedule, Section , showing A. C. Spengler’s service resumed
on  July .
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help in building ‘the new Security Police’ that Vorster asked him to head,
and particularly BOSS’s forerunner, the secretive Republican Intelligence
Service, created because SB members attending political meetings were
recognised, which made it ‘exceedingly diﬃcult to debrief sources afterwards
without risking their lives’. It was the ‘old-style gentleman’ Spengler who,
under cover of opening a private detective agency, would pioneer the training
of ‘askaris’ – ‘Black agents whose main target [was] to inﬁltrate the ranks of
Black liberation movements’. In a ﬁnale to the antics of his Drum years,
Spengler formally announced his departure from the SB for this much less
ubiquitous but surely more lethal role in a newspaper interview which ‘paid
tribute to the sincerity of the political activists whom he had kept under
surveillance’.
CONC LU S I O N
The  years from  to  gave the NP government little cause to
question the fundamental architecture of the police force it inherited from its
predecessor, including the SB, whose harassment of apartheid’s opponents
soon came to epitomise the regime. Nor did the NP have reason to doubt the
loyalty of long-serving policemen, among them SB oﬃcers who had pursued
anti-war republicans during the s. Even under the more openly
Nationalist direction of Rademeyer and Prinsloo from , the SB under-
went little quantitative or qualitative institutional change. From the baseline
ﬁeld staﬀ of  that Palmer had said in  would be needed countrywide to
administer the Suppression of Communism Act, the SB had grown by the
early s only to about  overall, half of whom were black with one-third
of the whites based at headquarters. A December  estimate of
South Africa’s preparations against ‘insurgency’ called the SB ‘a very small
organization’ that could not prevent ‘a disciplined clandestine organization’
from ‘planning and implement[ing]’ ‘sabotage or violence’, bringing arms or
explosives into the country ‘for subversive purposes’, disseminating ‘sub-
versive literature’, or moving its members in and out of the country. The
reference clearly was to MK’s then year-long sabotage campaign. The SB did
expand in the ﬁrst year of Van den Bergh’s leadership as some of its veterans
transferred to Republican Intelligence while ostensibly resigning and being
 D’Oliveira, Vorster, –; J. Sanders, Apartheid’s Friends: The Rise and Fall of
South Africa’s Secret Service (London, ), –; P. C. Swanepoel, Really Inside
BOSS: A Tale of South Africa’s Late Intelligence Service (and Something About the CIA)
(Derdepoortpark, South Africa, ), ; Swanepoel (email to author,  June , for
closing quotation).
 G. Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa’s Secret Police (Harmondsworth, UK, ),
; T. Bell, with D. B. Ntsebeza,Unﬁnished Business: South Africa, Apartheid, and Truth
(London, ), –.
 Slovo, Slovo, . In his docudrama Drum (Johannesburg, ), Zola Maseko
suggests that Spengler suborned the murder of crusading journalist Henry Nxumalo by a
township gangster.
 See tables for authorised establishments in CAD SAP //, kindly copied for me
by Fred Kooijmans.
 ‘Country Internal Defense Plan’, encl. in A-, J. C. Satterthwaite, American
Embassy, Pretoria, to Department of State, Washington,  Dec. , reproduced in
Declassiﬁed Documents Reference System (Farmington Hills, ).
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replaced ‘from the ranks of the CID and uniform branches’, but its growth
was nothing like on the scale suggested in some accounts.
At least until  little had changed in the state’s ability to counter ‘a
disciplined clandestine organization’ since the OB’s Stormjaer division had
conducted its own campaign of subversion and sabotage two decades before.
In legislative terms – given the emergency measures Smuts had at his disposal
during the war, with their draconian penalties for sabotage and their
provisions for control orders and indeﬁnite detention – the Nationalists by
the mid-s had only recently armed the state with powers equal to those of
the earlier era, as Vorster and his critics from diﬀerent perspectives observed.
The main diﬀerence from the late s through the early s lay in
increasing white solidarity and, hence, the political and administrative will
needed to repress the state’s most dangerous opponents. The saboteurs of the
early s also had little purchase on the loyalties of the SAP’s black
members, who although now a majority in the force were unrepresented in
the higher police ranks, unlike their Afrikaner counterparts two decades
previously, with all the ambiguous potential that had entailed both for
subversion and its containment.
Among white policemen of all ranks, the new targets of political
suppression caused far less internal dissension than those that had tested
their reliability in wartime. With anti-communism and eﬀorts to curb black
nationalism the common ground between them, two particularly controver-
sial police factions populated the Special Branch that was created in the ﬁnal
years of Smuts’s UP government and elaborated by its NP successor: ﬁrst
those who had pursued anti-war ‘subversives’ in the s, and then those
who themselves had been interned and were readmitted to the police after
. For these and many other white policemen whose careers spanned the
period from the s to the s, their concerted post- focus on
common enemies was facilitated by a variety of beliefs or rationalisations.
Policemen who had served continuously and willingly through the s
maintained that they were politically neutral professionals whose duty was to
the state, or that inwardly they had always been nationalists who were now
able to express their Afrikaner identities openly. Meanwhile those with
broken service, or who had retained their positions despite being suspected of
obstructionism in the s, could feel that the consolidation of NP rule
vindicated their earlier stance. Yet, wartime cleavages, for all that they went
unspoken and were superseded by the common purpose of the early apartheid
decades, were not forgotten. The members of each group knew their former
antagonists, monitored the progress of their careers, and kept each other close.
 Swanepoel e-mail to author,  Aug. .
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